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FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT: AN INHERENT
INJUSTICE
CHRISTOPHER HANER*
INTRODUCTION

The practice of disenfranchising those who have broken societal rules
has ancient roots dating back to the Greek and Roman traditions of
prohibiting criminals from appearing in court, making speeches, attending
assemblies, serving in the army and voting.' These traditions, which later
came to be known as "civil death," spread to Europe after the fall of the
Roman Empire. 2 In England, after the offender was convicted of a "heinous
crime," "civil death" carried three penalties: "forfeiture, so-called
'corruption of the blood' (which prohibited the guilty party from retaining,
inheriting, or passing an estate to his heirs), and loss of civil rights."3
England saw fit to institute these "civil death" penalties because such
penalties stigmatized the offender and his family and served as a warning
to the rest of the community. 4 When the English colonists settled in
America, "they brought with them their common-law traditions including
'civil death."'5 Over time, many of the elements of "civil death" were
removed from our common-law tradition; however, "one aspect of 'civil
remained very much intact in the colonies: felony
death'
disenfranchisement." 6
After the Revolutionary War, states were given the power to establish
voter qualifications under Article I, Section Two of the United States

* Christopher Haner is an associate at the Law Office of Roy A. List and a former student at St. John's
University School of Law (J.D., 2012).
1 See William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, and
Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 616 (2007); see also ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF
Ex-FELONS 16 (2006).
2 See Liles, supranote 1, at 616.
3 See id. at 616-17 (quoting HULL, supra note 1, at 16).
4 See id. at 617; see also Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
DisenfranchisementLaw in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1085 (2002).
5 Liles, supra note 1, at 617; see also Ewald, supra note 4, at 1059.
6 Liles, supra note 1, at 617.
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Constitution7 and were granted "'broad powers to determine the conditions
under which the right of suffrage may be exercised." 8 By the eve of the
Civil War twenty-four states, or over seventy percent of the then existing
states, "had statutes barring felons from voting or had felon
disenfranchisement provisions in their state constitutions." 9 Since this time,
the number of states which have enacted felon disenfranchisement
provisions has grown rapidly.
Today, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia disenfranchise
felons who are presently incarcerated. Thirty-five states prohibit
felons from voting while on parole, and thirty states bar voting while
on probation. Twelve states disenfranchise all or some categories of
felons for life, with two of those states disenfranchising felons for life
upon a second felony conviction. 10
The growth of felon disenfranchisement laws presents a very real
problem for several reasons. First, by disenfranchising those who have
been convicted of felonies, these laws have the effect of stigmatizing the
felon as a second class citizen who is not fit to vote in his or her own
country's elections. In effect, the felon becomes an outcast within his or her
own domain and loses one of the most sacred rights of the American
individual, the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice. By
committing a felony, even one of a more minor nature, the felon is
"deemed unworthy of exercising what the Supreme Court has called 'the
right preservative of all other rights,' the franchise.""I Second, the voting
power of our nation's most needy and crime-ridden communities is
substantially diluted as these laws work to disenfranchise many of their
once eligible voting members. These laws should not punish communities
and the individuals who live in these communities for being or living in

7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.").
8 George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 851, 853 (2005) (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51
(1959)).
9 See Liles, supra note 1, at 617; see also Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic
Contraction?Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc.
REV. 777, 781 (2002).
10 Liles, supra note 1, at 617-18; see also Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (1998),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fdlosingthevote.pdf [hereinafter Losing the Vote].
II ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF Ex-FELONS 1, 1 (2006) (quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
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"bad neighborhoods," yet this is the effect they have.
Finally, these laws retard the workings of our democratic system
generally. By disenfranchising felons, we lose the voice of an entire
population of citizens, voices that can provide the much needed insight into
the various problems with our criminal justice system and can help reform
it. Furthermore, by denying this class of citizens the right to vote, those in
power are more easily able to retain that power. When an entire class of
citizens, such as felons, are denied the right to vote, they cannot effect a
change in the power structure that marginalized them; they cannot remove
the leaders who created, voted for, and enforce the very laws that keep
them out of power. Elizabeth Hull has commented:
[w]hat are legislators to do if ballots are cast by too many
'undesirables' - classes of voters, say, whom they presume would
support the 'wrong' sort of candidate? They can attach a 'felony'
label to activity associated with these troublemakers and thereby
expunge at least some of their names from the voting rosters. 12
Our democracy was intended to give a voice to the voiceless, not to give
those with power the choice to decide who has a voice and who does not.
This is a cyclical problem that must be ended if we wish to see our criminal
justice system reformed and democracy restored.
Section I of this paper examines the impact felon disenfranchisement
laws have both on the U.S. population as a whole and the even graver
impact they have on minorities and minority communities. Section II
examines past attempts to challenge these laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 ("VRA"). Section II includes an in depth examination of the holdings
and procedural history of Hayden v. Patterson and Farrakhan v.
Washington. These cases represent the debate of whether disenfranchised,
minority felons may state a cause of action under the VRA. Section III
examines the impact of the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Farrakhan
which effectively ended the split between the Ninth and Second Circuits.
Section IV of this paper discusses alternative grounds for attack. These
alternatives include pursing claims under the Eighth Amendment and
attacking the criminal justice system itself. Section IV further suggests that
this may be accomplished by either pushing for individualized judicial
determinations of disenfranchisement on a case-by-case basis and/or
petitioning both the state and federal governments for legislative reforms.
12 Id at 6.
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These reforms are made timely by the Supreme Court's ruling that felon
disenfranchisement laws do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution and the, now universal, view of the circuit courts that the VRA
is not implicated by felon disenfranchisement laws.
I. IMPACT OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
A. U.S. Population as a Whole

"No other democratic country in the world denies as many people - in
absolute or proportional terms - the right to vote because of felony
convictions." 1 3 This is due to our ever-increasing push to punish those who
break the laws of our society through arrest, prosecution, conviction and
imprisonment.14 The United States has claimed the crown as the world's
most frequent incarcerator; it is estimated that "[a]s of 2008, 1 of every 134
Americans was incarcerated [either] in prison or jail." 15 These numbers
represent a "seven-fold" increase from "less than 200,000 in 1970 to
1,613,556 by 2009."16 When we combine these numbers with those who
are forced to serve a mandatory probationary period after committing a
crime, the numbers become even more staggering. Using data gathered by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Sentencing Project has determined that
"[t]here are now more than 7.3 million Americans incarcerated or on
probation or parole."' 7 As our push to punish through disenfranchisement
continues, its harmful effects become multiplied.
It is important to note that disenfranchisement laws not only deny the
vote to people who are currently incarcerated; instead "nearly threequarters. . . of the disenfranchised are not in prison, but are on probation,
or parole or have completed their sentences." 18 Taken cumulatively, "[a]n
estimated 5.85 million Americans, or one in forty-one adults, have
currently or permanently lost their voting rights as a result of conviction." 1 9
13 Losing the Vote, supra note 10, at 1.
14 See Facts about Prisons and Prisoners, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (2013),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc factsAboutPrisons Jan20l3.pdf
[hereinafter Facts about Prisons]; see also Kamala Mallik-Kane, Barbara Parthasarathy, & William
Adams, Examining Growth in the FederalPrison Population,1998-2010, URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE
POLICY CENTER RESEARCH REPORT 3 (2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412720-ExaminingGrowth-in-the-Federal-Prison-Population.pdf.
15 Facts aboutPrisons,supra note 14.
16 Id
17 Id
18 Losing the Vote, supra note 10, at 8.
19 Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, The Sentencing Project (2013),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-bs-fdlawsinusJun2013.pdf [hereinafter Felony

2013]

FELONDISENFRANCIHSEMENT

91I5

After considering the raw numbers presented above, it should be clear that
felon disenfranchisement laws have the effect of silencing the voice of
many felons, ex-felons, parolees and those sentenced to probation, as well
as affecting the "political voice of many American communities." 20
However, if the raw numbers alone are not enough to shock the conscious,
consider this: in 2006 it was estimated that if all disenfranchised felons and
ex-felons "congregated in a single geographical area, it would become the
nation's second-largest city, right behind New York." 2 1
B. Minorities and Minority Communities

The numbers cited above are representative of the United States
population as a whole; however, when considered in terms of race, it
becomes clear that "[t]he racial impact of disenfranchisement laws is
particularly egregious." 22 It is estimated that "39% of persons in prison or
jail in 2009 were black [while] 22% were Hispanic." 23 The Sentencing
Project has estimated that "Black males have a 32% chance of serving time
in prison at some point in their lives [while] Hispanic males have a 17%
chance [and] white males have [only] a 6% chance." 24 From 1988 to 1998
"the black men's rate [of incarceration] increased ten times the white men's
increase" 25 while "Hispanics los[t] their vote due to a conviction
approximately five times more often than whites." 26
Black Americans are the most affected in terms of proportionality.
Today it is estimated that "[t]hirteen percent of all adult black men - 1.4
million - are disenfranchised, representing one-third of the total
disenfranchised population and reflecting a rate of disenfranchisement that
is seven times the national average." 27 Furthermore, if the rates of
incarceration continue to increase "three in ten of the next generation of
Disenfranchisement Laws]; see also Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of
Maintenance,59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 964 (2008).
20 Felony DisenfranchisementLaws, supra note 19.
21

HULL, supra note 11, at 1.

22 Losing the Vote, supranote 10, at 1.
23 Facts about Prisons and Prisoners, THE
SENTENCING
PROJECT
(2013),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc-factsAboutPisonsJan2013.pdf
[hereinafter Facts about Prisons].
24 Id
25 Losing the Vote, supranote 10, at 12.
26
Bailey Figler, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon
Disenfranchisement,61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 723, 746 (2006) (citing ALEC EWALD, PUNISHING
AT THE POLLS: THE CASE AGAINST DISENFRANCHISING CITIZENS WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS 37
(2003)).

27 Losing the Vote, supra note 10, at 8; see Study: Non-Voting Felons Increasing, ABCNEWS
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/storyid=121724.
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black men can expect to be disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime
[; while] [i]n states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, as many as 40% of
black men may permanently lose their right to vote." 28 It should be clear
that "[s]tate laws restricting the ability of persons who have been convicted
of a felony from exercising the franchise may represent the single most
pressing issue facing electoral participation by minority citizens." 29
The adverse racial impact of felon disenfranchisement laws is extremely
troubling for two reasons. First, minority citizens are arguably already
marginalized by their racial status alone. Minorities have traditionally had
the least access to power in the United States and disenfranchisement laws
have the effect of taking away the power they fought so hard to gain during
the civil rights era. In fact, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has declared
that "disenfranchisement . .. is the biggest hindrance to black voting since

the poll tax," 30 while the Leaders Conference on Civil Rights has declared
that the rate of black disenfranchisement "threaten[s] to negate fifty years
of hard-fought civil rights progress." 31 Arguably these laws were not
created to have racial implications; however, the fact of the matter is they
do and they are retarding minority access to power. Shockingly, "more
black men are disqualified today by the operation of criminal
disenfranchisement laws than were actually enfranchised by the passage of
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870."32
Second, minority citizens disproportionately tend to live in our nation's
poorest and most crime ridden communities. This has negative implications
both for the individuals in these communities and the communities
themselves. Individuals who are disenfranchised in these neighborhoods
have no say in the way their communities are governed. 33 "Unlike voters,
28 Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, The Sentencing Project (2013),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd bs fdlawsinusJun2013.pdf [hereinafter Felony
DisenfranchisementLaws]; see also Maya Harris, Black Men Barredfrom the Ballot Box, ACLU OF
3,
2007),
CALIFORNIA
(April
NORTHERN
https://www.aclunc.org/about/seniorstaff/maya harris/blackmen-barredfromtheballotbox.shtml.
29 Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 964
(2008); see Losing the Vote, supra note 13, at 8 ("Election voting statistics offer an approximation of
the political importance of black disenfranchisement: 1.4 million black men are disenfranchised
compared to 4.6 million black men who voted in 1996."); see also LYNNE M. CASPER & LORETTA E.
BASS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1996 (July

1998).
30 HULL, supra note I1, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over
Felon Disenfranchisement,56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2004).
33 See HULL, supra note 30, at 1; Neema Trivedi & Jenny Rose Flanagan, Allowing Parolees to
16, 2006, available at
Vote
Would Rebuild Lives, THE DENVER POST, July
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/allowing parolees-to vote-would-rebuild-lives/.
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they can't stop the deterioration of their neighborhood schools or prevent
yet another waste incinerator from moving in nearby." 34 Individuals who
are not disenfranchised and who live in our nation's poorest
neighborhoods, especially those with parents who have suffered
disenfranchisement, may not feel that voting is important or may feel that it
is a useless exercise of political power because they do not see the fruits of
exercising this right. Because they feel they cannot vote more tax money
into their neighborhood to improve decaying schools and the general
standard of living, they may feel that they must fend for themselves. This,
in many instances, may drive minority youths to crime as the means to
power, which, should they be arrested and convicted, will continue this
cycle.
Communities are affected in much the same way. If a neighborhood has
a large number of citizens living in it who are disenfranchised, the
community loses power because a large number of its citizens cannot vote;
the community's political influence is diluted by artificially depressing the
voting-eligible population. 35 Therefore, they will not see the changes they
need, will feel marginalized and eventually could lose faith in the political
process.
II. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO ATTACK FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
LAWS

A. ConstitutionalChallenge- 14th Amendment, Equal ProtectionClause
Though state felon disenfranchisement laws have been attacked in the
past as a violation of the United States Constitution, these laws have been
upheld. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a plain langue reading of
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows a state to prohibit
felons from voting. 36 Despite this general rule, the Court in Hunter v.
34 HULL, supra note 11, at 1-5.
35 John C. Keeney Jr., Felon Disenfranchisement, in AMERICA VOTES!: A GUIDE TO MODERN
ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 91, 92 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed., 2008); Dori Elizabeth Martin,
Comment, Lifting the Fog: Ending Felony Disenfranchisement in Virginia, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 471,

486 (2012).

36 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43, 55 (1974). In this case, Plaintiffs claimed that
provisions of the California Constitution and implementing statutes which disenfranchised persons
convicted of an "infamous crime" denied them the right to equal protection of the laws under the
Federal Constitution. Id. Despite the Court's holding, it noted "we may rest on the demonstrably sound
proposition that § 1 [of the 14"h Amendment], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have
been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less
drastic section of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement." Id.
at 55. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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Underwood held that a state felon disenfranchisement law violates the
Equal Protection Clause when it is established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that racial discrimination was a "substantial or motivating factor
in the adoption" of the law. 37 If this is proven, the complainant will prevail
"unless registrars prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same
would have resulted had the impermissible purpose not been considered." 38
The Court noted "we are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit ...
purposeful racial discrimination ... which otherwise violates § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 3 9
B. VRA Challenge
As a result of the Supreme Court's holdings in Richardson v.
Ramirez and Hunter v. Underwood, it was apparent that very few felon
disenfranchisement laws would be deemed unconstitutional as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. As such, those who opposed these laws
looked for another avenue of attack, eventually challenging them on the
ground that they violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 40 These claims
have enjoyed notable success, especially in the Ninth Circuit, though they
have not been adopted by any circuit as of yet.

Representatives shall be appointed among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participationin rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State.
Id. (emphasis added).
37 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985).
38 Id.
39 Id at 232.
40 William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, and
Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 624 (2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2010) ("(a) No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement or the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.. . . (b) A violation of subsection (a)
is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political process leading
to nomination or election in the State of political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity that
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered provided that nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population.").
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a. Hayden v. Paterson
Hayden v. Paterson began as Hayden v. Pataki, a claim filed by Joseph
Hayden, pro se, in the Southern District of New York on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated. 4 1 The plaintiffs to the suit were "black and
[L]atino individuals who ha[d] been convicted of felonies under the laws of
the state of New York and were . .. currently incarcerated in the New York
prison system or on parole." 4 2 Because of their status as felons, plaintiffs
were not permitted to vote in state or federal elections pursuant to New
York Election Law section 5-106(2). 43 Through their suit, plaintiffs sought
to invalidate New York Constitution Article II, Section 344 and New York
Election Law Section 5-106(2) on federal constitutional grounds and as
violative of the VRA.45 Specifically, in regard to their VRA claim,
plaintiffs claimed that New York Constitution Article II, Sections 3 and 5106(2) violated Section 2 of the VRA, based on "Section 5-106(2)'s
disproportionate impact on incarcerated and paroled Blacks and Latinos . . .
[and] Section 5-106(2)'s dilution of the voting strength of Blacks and
Latinos and certain minority communities in New York State." 46 Before the
court in this case was defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. 47
The court granted defendants' motion, 48 holding that "[p]laintiffs' claims
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . must be dismissed in
light of the Second Circuit's recent holding in Muntaqim v. Coombe." 49

On appeal, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the question of
whether the VRA applies to a claim that a disenfranchisement statute, such
as § 5-106, acting in combination with historic racial discrimination
allegedly afflicting the New York criminal justice system as well as society
at large, results in the denial to Black and Latino prisoners the right to vote
on account of race. 50 Jose A. Cabranes, writing for the majority, held that
41 Hayden v. Pataki, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863, *2 (2004), af'dsub nom. Hayden v. Paterson,
594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2010).
42 Hayden, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863 at *3.
43 See id.; see also N.Y. Elec. Law §5-106(2) ("No person who has been convicted of a felony
pursuant to the laws of this state, shall have the right to register for or vote at any election unless he
shall have been pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor, or his maximum
sentence of imprisonment has expired, or he has been discharged from parole. . .. ").
44 N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 3 ". . . The Legislature shall enact laws excluding from the right of
suffrage all persons convicted of bribery or of any infamous crime."
45 Hayden, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863 at *2.
46 Id. at *5-*6.
47 Id. at *2, *3.
48 Id. at *3.
49 Id. at *16; see Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004) ("§1973 cannot be used
to challenge the legality of §5-106.").
50 Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 314 (2006) (en banc).
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the VRA prohibition against voting qualifications or prerequisites that
resulted in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or
color did not apply to the plaintiffs' vote denial and dilution claims. 51
Cabranes made clear:
the Voting Rights Act does not encompass these felon
disenfranchisement provisions.

...

Our holding is based on our

conclusion that Congress did not intend or understand the Voting
Rights Act to encompass such felon disenfranchisement
statutes, 52 that application of the Voting Rights Act to felon
disenfranchisement statues such as these would alter the
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government, 53 and that Congress at the very least did not clearly
indicate that it intended the Voting Rights Act to alter the federal
balance in this way 54 . . . . In light of our conclusion that the
Voting Rights Act does not encompass felon disenfranchisement
provisions and that plaintiffs thus cannot state a vote denial claim
under the statute, it is clear that plaintiffs also cannot state a
claim for vote dilution based on the assertion that the denial of
the vote to incarcerated felons and parolees dilutes the voting
51 Id
52 See id. at 310. In support of its conclusion that Congress did not intend to include felon
disenfranchisement provisions within the coverage of the VRA, the court listed its reasons. See id. at
315-16. The court noted
These reasons include (1) the explicit approval given such laws in the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the
long history and continuing prevalence of felon disenfranchisement provisions throughout the United
States; (3) the statements in the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports and on the Senate floor
explicitly excluding felon disenfranchisement laws from provisions in the statute; (4) the absence of any
affirmative consideration of felon disenfranchisement laws during either the 1965 passage of the Act or
its 1982 revision; (5) the introduction thereafter of bills specifically intended to include felon
disenfranchisement provisions with the VRA's coverage (and their subsequent defeat]; (6) the
enactment of a felon disenfranchisement statute for the District of Columbia by Congress soon after the
passage of the Voting Rights Act; and (7) the subsequent passage of statutes designed to facilitate
removal of convicted felons from the voting rolls.
Id.
53 See id. at 310. "Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly leaves the federal balance
intact with regard to felon disenfranchisement laws specifically. . . Therefore, extending the coverage
of the Voting Rights Act to these provisions would introduce a change in the federal balance not
contemplated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have little difficulty concluding that
application of the Voting Rights Act to prisoner disenfranchisement provisions like that of New York
would effect a change in the federal balance. These laws, applying as they do only to cunently
incarcerated felons and parolees, implicate no less than three important state interests: (1) the regulation
of the franchise; (2) the State's authority to craft its criminal law; and (3) the regulation of correctional
institutions." See id. at 326.
54 See id. at 310. "Our decision not to apply § 1973 to felon disenfranchisement provisions is
confirmed and supported by the operation of the clear statement rule . . . a cannon of interpretation
which requires Congress to make its intent 'unmistakably clear' when enacting statutes that would alter
the usual constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States.... Accordingly, to the
extent that the Voting Rights Act would affect this balance if applied to felon disenfranchisement
statutes, we must construe the statute not to encompass such provisions if it is even unclear whether
Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to apply to such laws." See id at 323.
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strength of minority communities. 55
The holding of Hayden is representative of the majority view of circuits
that have paused to consider such a claim. 56 Though only four circuits have
heard such claims, it seems likely that Hayden will continue to represent
the majority, if not universal, view for the foreseeable future.
b. Farrakhan v. Washington
Farrakhanv. Washington began as Farrakhanv. Locke, a claim filed in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. In
this case, the court was presented with a defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. 57
Plaintiffs were African-American, Hispanic-American and NativeAmerican felons. 58 Plaintiffs challenged the State of Washington's felon
disenfranchisement scheme 59 as violative of the VRA as well as the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. 60 Plaintiffs' complaint was very similar to the
complaint filed in Hayden v. Pataki, in that it alleged that "minorities are
disproportionately prosecuted and sentenced, resulting in their
disproportionate representation among the persons disenfranchised under
the Washington Constitution [and as a result] Washington law causes vote
denial and vote dilution on the basis of race, in violation of the VRA."61
Though the District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' vote dilution claim under the VRA62 and plaintiffs'
55 Id. at 328.
56 See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1015 (2005)); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 41 (1st Cir. 2009) (cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 412 (2010)).
57 Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F.Supp 1304, 1304 (1997).
58 Id. at 1307.
59 See WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("All persons of the age of eighteen or over who are citizens of
the United States and who have lived in the state, and precinct thirty days immediately preceding the
election at which they offer to vote, except those disqualified by Art VI, section 3 of this Constitution,
shall be entitled to vote at all elections."); see also WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("All persons convicted
of infamous crime unless restored to their civil rights and all persons while they are judicially declared
mentally incompetent are excluded from the elective franchise."); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.079
("An 'infamous crime' is a crime punishable by death in the state penitentiary or imprisonment in a
state correctional facility. Neither an adjudication in juvenile court pursuant to chapter 13.40 RCW, nor
a conviction for a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor, is an 'infamous crime."').
60 Farrakhan,987 F.Supp at 1307.
61 Id.
62 Id. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that that plaintiffs were required to prove "(1) the
minority group in question must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a voting district; (2) the group must be politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority group
must vote sufficiently as a bloc so as to enable it to usually defeat the minority group's preferred
candidate." Id. at 1313. The court noted "Plaintiffs Complaint and memorandum make conclusory
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constitutional claims, it split with the Second Circuit in denying
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for vote denial under the
VRA.63 Instead, the court concluded that plaintiffs had "alleged sufficient
facts to state a claim for vote denial under the VRA."64
Defendants and Plaintiffs then both moved for summary judgment on
their claims. After considering both motions the court concluded that
though "[p]laintiffs' evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice
system, and the resulting disproportionate impact on minority voting
power, is compelling,. . . " analyzing the disenfranchisement provision

under the totality of the circumstanceS65 "illustrates that the cause of this
reduction is not the voting qualification; instead, the cause is bias external
to the voting qualification," namely the criminal justice system itself.6 6
Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted and all plaintiffs'
claims were dismissed. 6 7
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the
case to the district court, holding that evidence of racial bias in the criminal
justice system should not have been excluded from a totality of the
circumstances analysis under Section 2 of the VRA.68 On remand, the
district court held that they were "compelled to find that there is
discrimination in Washington's criminal justice system on account of race"
69 and that this discrimination "'clearly hinder[s] the ability of racial
minorities to participate effectively in the political process, as
disenfranchisement is automatic."' 70 The court noted, however, that the
"remarkable absence of any history of official discrimination in
Washington factors heavily in the analysis of totality of the circumstances
analysis." 71 The court concluded "[t]aking all of the relevant factors into
account .... the totality of the circumstances does not support a finding
that Washington's felon disenfranchisement law results in discrimination in

statements about the existence of these factors, but nowhere do they allege any facts of, for instance,
voter cohesiveness." Id
63 Id at 1304.
6 Id. at 1312.
65 Farrakhan v. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, *14, *18 (2000) (emphasis added).
66 Id. at *4, *14-15 (2000) (emphasis added).
67 Id. at *1.
68 Farrakhan,338 F.3d at 1012 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,47 (1986)).
69 Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987, * 18 (2006)
70 Id (citing Farrakhan,338 F.3d at 1020).
71 Id. at *25-26; see also John C. Keeney Jr., Felon Disenfranchisement, in AMERICA VOTES!: A
GUIDE TO MODERN ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 91, 95 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed., 2008)
(applying the nine-factor test of Thornburg v. Gingles the court concluded that the totality of
circumstances did to support a Voting Rights Act violation).
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its electoral process on account of race." 72 The court, therefore, granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 73
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted summary judgment for
the plaintiffs. 74 The court noted "[w]e agree with Plaintiffs for the reason
that, given the strength of their Factor 5 showing, 75 the district court erred
in requiring them to prove Factors that had little if any relevance to their
particular vote denial claim." 76 The court further noted "[t]he failure to
show that a state has a history of discriminatory voting practices . . . does

not negate a showing that the current voting practice at issue is
discriminatory." 77 Therefore, the court held "the 'on account of
requirement may be met 'where the discriminatory impact of a challenged
voting practice is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding
social and historical circumstances,' which includes the state's criminal
justice system." 78 The court concluded "[w]e are bound by FarrakhanI's
holding that § 2 of the VRA applies to Washington's felon
disenfranchisement law. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the
discriminatory impact of Washington's felon disenfranchisement is
attributable to racial discrimination in Washington's criminal justice
system; thus, Washington's felon disenfranchisement law violates § 2 of
the VRA."79
However, the notable success of plaintiffs' claim was short lived. In
reconsidering the matter, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded:
"[t]hree circuits - two sitting en banc - have disagreed with FarrakhanI
and concluded that felon disenfranchisement laws are categorically exempt
from challenges brought under section 2 of the VRA. ... In light of those
opinions, we conclude that the rule announced in FarrakhanI sweeps too

72 Farrakhan,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987 at *29.
73 Id.
74 Farrakhan v. Washington, 590 F.3d 989, 993 (2010).
75 Id. at 1004. The court is referring to the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments
which identified "typical factors" that may be relevant in analyzing whether section 2 has been violated.
See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07. These Factors
include
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched
the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or other-wise to participate in the
democratic process; ... (5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process ...
Id.
76 Farrakhan,590 F.3d at 1004.
77 Id. at 1007-08.
78 Id. at 1009 (citing Farrakhan v. Locke, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-1020 (2003)).
79 Id
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broadly."8 0
Despite the apparent loss suffered by plaintiffs in Farrakhan,several
victories were won. First, plaintiffs were successful not only in
demonstrating that there was evidence of racial discrimination in
Washington's criminal justice system, but were able to convince the courts
that this evidence "and the resulting disproportionate impact on minority
voting power [was] compelling."8 1 Second, plaintiffs in this case were able
to achieve something plaintiffs in Hayden could not: they were able to
convince the Ninth Circuit that "the failure to show that a state has a
history of discriminatory voting practices ... does not negate a showing
that the current voting practice is discriminatory." 82 In effect, they were
able to convince the court that despite the fact that the disenfranchisement
provision was not enacted with the taint of racial animus, the provision still
had discriminatory effects, and therefore, when working in tandem with the
tainted criminal justice system, should be considered as if it were a racially
discriminatory law. 83 Though the Ninth Circuit eventually overturned its
decision and agreed with the Second Circuit's holding in Farrakhan,
plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that their claim may be a viable one.
Given the right circuit and making the same arguments as those advanced
by plaintiffs in Farrakhan, future disenfranchised minorities may enjoy
success on such a claim.
III. IMPACT OF NINTH CIRCUIT'S EN BANC OPINION IN FARRAKHAN

The Ninth Circuit should have allowed the ruling of summary judgment
for plaintiffs to stand. As noted by the court in Farrakhan"[p]laintiffs'
vote denial claims create a constitutional problem when construed as a
facial challenge. ... If the Court ultimately concluded that Washington's
provision was invalid with respect to racial minorities, then only white
felons could be disenfranchised so long as racial bias existed in the
criminal justice system. That would obviously create an Equal Protection
problem." 84 Had the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs' grant of summary
judgment to stand, it would have effectively forced the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari to resolve the then existing circuit split. This action should
have been taken by the Supreme Court in 2004 when it refused to grant
80
81
82
83
84

Farrakhan v. Washington, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20803, *5 (2010) (per curium).
Farrakhan v. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, *3-4, 14-15 (2000) (emphasis added).
Farrakhan v. Washington, 590 F.3d 989,1004 (2010).
Id. at 1009 (citing Farrakhan v. Locke, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-20 (2003)).
Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. at *6-7.
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certiorari of the Farrakhan and Muntaqim cases.8 5As indicated by the
Second Circuit in Hayden, these claims pose "a complex and difficult
question that, absent Congressional clarification, will only be definitively
resolved by the Supreme Court." 86 Instead of forcing the Supreme Court to
definitively answer the question of whether disenfranchised racial
minorities can state a cause of action for vote dilution and denial under the
VRA, the question remains unanswered at the national level, which allows
for further circuit splits on this issue and further uncertainty.
IV. OTHER GROUNDS FOR ATTACK

A. 8th Amendment Concerns
"The asymmetry of disenfranchisement has prompted scholarship
suggesting that it raises serious Eighth Amendment concerns." 87 However,
in neither Farrakhannor Hayden, did the plaintiffs advance such a claim.8 8
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in Farrakhanand Hayden are not anomalies.
Instead, "Eighth Amendment challenges to such laws have received
surprisingly short shrift [and] advocates have not presented Eighth
Amendment claims with much vigor."89
There is one overarching reason for these phenomena, found in the
Supreme Court's ruling in Trop v. Dulles;90 the Court stated, in dicta, that
the disenfranchisement of convicted felons simply is not punishment 9'
under the Eighth Amendment. 9 2 Therefore, "[w]hen presented with Eighth
Amendment challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws, judges typically
rely on ... Trop v. Dulles for the proposition that disenfranchisement is not
'punishment'
for
Eighth
Amendment
purposes." 93
Instead,
disenfranchisement provisions are viewed by judges as regulatory rather

85 See Locke v. Farrakhan, 543 U.S. 984 (2004); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 543 U.S. 978 (2004).
86 Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006).
87 Bailey Figler, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723, 734 (2006).
88 See generally Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997); Hayden v. Pataki,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
89 Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: DisenfranchisedFelons and the ConstitutionalNo Man's
Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 99 (2005).
90 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
91 See id. at 96-97; see also Wilkins, supra note 89, at 88, 118 ("A party seeking to demonstrate a
violation of the Eighth Amendment must prove both (1) that the challenged action constitutes
'punishment' within the meaning of the Amendment and (2) that the punishment is 'cruel and
unusual."').
92 Trop, 356 U.S. at 96-97.
93 Wilkins, supranote 89, at 100.
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than penal statutes and, therefore the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel
and unusual punishment is not held to be applicable to such claims. 94
This is problematic for several reasons. First, "[a]lthough Trop v. Dulles
was indeed an Eighth Amendment case ... it did not concern the
disenfranchisement of felons." 95 Instead, the Court simply considered "a
hypothetical felony disenfranchisement statute." 96 The Court's statement
regarding felon disenfranchisement in Trop is clearly dicta, nothing more.
As such, it is not entitled to be cited as persuasive weight.
Furthermore, in Trop, "Chief Justice Warren identified no particular
served by disenfranchising the
legitimate, nonpenal purposes
offender[].... Instead, he simply relied on two nineteenth-century
decisions - Davis v. Beanson and Murphy v. Ramsey - in which the Court
had upheld the denial of voting rights to polygamists as a simple regulation
of the franchise." 97 Both Davis and Murphy, however, "rested on the
proposition that a state's power to restrict the ability to vote is plenary, that
is, that virtually any restriction on eligibility for voting is legitimate." 9 8
Because this is clearly no longer the case, as is apparent after examining
the VRA, and because the reference to felon disenfranchisement laws in
Trop is nothing more than dicta, Trop has lost its precedential value, if it
ever truly had any. Because felon disenfranchisement laws can no longer
be seen as purely regulatory in nature, they can serve only one purpose: to
punish. As such, felon disenfranchisement laws have met the first prong of
Eighth Amendment analysis: felon disenfranchisement laws do
"constitute[] 'punishment' within the meaning of the Amendment." 99
Under the second prong of the Eighth Amendment test, felons must
establish that the punishment of disenfranchisement is cruel and unusual.'oo
There are two ways to accomplish this. First, they may argue that these
laws "violate[] the country's 'evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."'l' Though no easy task, there is evidence
that our country no longer views felon disenfranchisement as aligned with
94 John C. Keeney Jr., Felon Disenfranchisement, in AMERICA VoTEs!: A GUIDE TO MODERN
ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 91, 93 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed., 2008).

95 Wilkins, supra note 89, at 88; see Trap, 356 U.S. at 86.
96 Wilkins, supra note 89, at 101; see Trop, 356 U.S. at 96-97.
97 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over
Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L.REV. 1147, 1150-55 (2004); see Trop, 356 U.S. at 97.
98 Karlan, supra note 97, at 1151; see Davis v. Beanson, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); see also Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
99 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 94.
100 See id; see also Karlan, supra, note 97, at 99 (providing an example to show that proof of cruel
and unusual punishment is required for an Eighth Amendment claim).
101 Wilkins, supra note 89, at 137; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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our evolving standards of decency. In fact, a recent "public opinion poll
suggests that approximately 80% of the American public supports
restoration of voting rights for most ex-felons."l 02
Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated in Atkins v. Virginiathat there
are two factors that might "inform a court's assessment of whether a
punishment offends contemporary standards: recent legislative decisions
and trends and approaches within the world community."l 03 As is
especially true in the case of ex-offender disenfranchisement, "both types
of evidence support the conclusion that the punishment is inconsistent with
contemporary notions of appropriate penal sanctions." 104
Thirty years ago, when the Supreme Court upheld lifetime
disqualifications in Richard v. Ramirez, twenty-eight states
inflicted lifetime disenfranchisement. Only eight continue that
practice today. Since Richardson v. Ramirez, no state has
enacted legislation barring ex-offenders from voting. The
consistency of the direction of change provides powerful
evidence of a national consensus, particularly given the wellknown fact that anti-crime legislation is far more popular then
legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent
crimes. Similarly, consensus within the world community is
uniformly against lifetime disenfranchisement. Thus, the states
that continue to exclude all felons permanently are outliers,
both within the United States and in the world. 05
Second, felons may argue that disenfranchisement is a "grossly
disproportionate" punishment for a particular offensel 0 6 as the "Eighth
Amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions and demands that the
'punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the
offence.'"07 This claim, however, may not be equally available to all

felons, depending on the severity of the crime committed. Those "subject to
permanent long term disenfranchisement for relatively minor felonies" will
have a much greater chance of success with this claim than those who have

102 Wilkins, supra note 89, at 141 (citing Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes toward Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 68 Pub. Opinion Q. 275, 280-81 (2004), available at
http://www.soc.umn.eduluggen/ManzaBrooksUggenPOQ04.pdf).
103 Karlan, supranote 97, at 1168; see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002).
104 Karlan, supranote 97, at 1168.
105 Id at 1168-69 (internal quotations omitted)
106 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that, for noncapital punishments, the Eighth Amendment forbids only punishment that is "grossly disproportionate"
to the crime at issue).
107 Karlan, supranote 97, at 1164-65 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (2002)).
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been convicted of more serious offenses.' 0 8 As eloquently stated by
Elizabeth Hull, "[d]isenfranchisement is an excessive penalty . .. [as well
as] an arbitrary one, inflicted on []felons without regard to either their
crime or their moral culpability, regardless of whether they committed
homicide or, in California, conspired to operate a motor vehicle without a
muffler." 09
Further supporting the proposition that felon disenfranchisement may be
violative of the Eighth Amendment is Justice Byron White's 1989 plurality
opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky in which Justice White explained "that the
government also violates the Eighth Amendment if it imposes a sentence
that 'makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more that the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering.""l 0 As is discussed in Section B of this paper, it is very
doubtful that felon disenfranchisement laws advance the traditional goals of
criminal sanction: deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. Therefore,
their continued legitimacy is further called into question as they "make[] no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment."I
B. The CriminalJustice System

The disenfranchised and eligible voters alike should also attack the
criminal justice system itself as it is the indirect cause of
disenfranchisement. As reported by the Sentencing Project,
the proportion of the population that is disenfranchised has
been exacerbated in recent years by the advent of harsh
sentencing policies such as mandatory sentence, 'three strikes'
laws and truth-in-sentencing laws. Although crime rates have
been relatively stable, these laws have increased the number of
offenders sent to prison and the length of time they serve.1 12
The impact of changed sentencing policies is readily apparent from
Department of Justice Data. For example "persons arrested for burglary had
a 53 percent greater likelihood of being sentenced to prison in 1992 than in
1980, while those arrested for larceny experienced a 100 percent

108 See Wilkins, supranote 89, at 142.
109 HULL, supra note 11, at 121 (2006).
110 Id at 116 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky,492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
Ill Id
112 Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony DisenfranchisementLaws in the United States, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT 11 (1998), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doclFile/FVR/fd-losingthevote.pdf
[hereinafter Losing the Vote].
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increase."' 13

What is perhaps worse is the ever-increasing rate of arrest, prosecution
and conviction of nonviolent offenders. It is estimated that "[e]ighty-four
percent of the increase in state prison admission during this period [19801992] was due to incarceration of nonviolent offenders."ll 4 Perhaps even
more shocking is that "[flifty-three percent of state inmates were sentenced
for nonviolent offenses.""15 Of those sentenced for nonviolent crimes, the
people arrested, prosecuted and convicted of drug charges has experienced
the most marked increase. It is estimated that "1 in 4 inmates in 2002 was
in jail for a drug offense, compared to 1 in 10 in 1983; drug offenders
constituted 22% of state prison inmates in 2006 and 52% of federal prison
inmates in 2008."l16 When we consider earlier years, we find that from
1980 to 1992 drug arrestees were "almost five times as likely to be sent to
prison in 1992 as in 1980."117 Clearly this is a compounding problem, and
the national war on drugs is doing far greater harm than good.
Considering the impact of our laws through a racial lens, we find that
minorities are disproportionately impacted by our criminal justice system.
African Americans fare the worst. The Sentencing Project has stated: "[t]he
striking disproportionate rate of disenfranchisement among African
American men reflects their disproportionate rate of incarceration. . . [from
1988 to 1998] the black men's rate increased ten times the white men's
increase.""l 8 The national war on drugs has had a particularly significant
impact on black arrest, prosecution and conviction.11 9 "Although drug use
and selling cuts across all racial, socio-economic and geographic lines, law
enforcement strategies have targeted street-level drug dealers and users in
low-income, predominantly minority, urban areas. As a result, the arrest
rates per 100,000 for drug offenses are six times higher for blacks than for
whites." 20 Considering the statistical evidence demonstrating the
113 Id (citing U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs (DOJ/OJP), "Prisoners in
1994," Bulletin NCJ-151654, (Washington, D.C.: DOJ, August 1995)).
114 Id.; see also MARC MAUER,THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: THE
INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION, 1992-1993 (1994).

115 Losing the Vote, supra note 112, at 12.
116 Facts

about

Prisons

and

Prisoners,

THE

SENTENCING

PROJECT

(2013),

http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc-factsAboutPrisons Jan2013.pdf
[hereinafter Facts about Prisons].
117 Losing the Vote, supra note 112, at 11.
118 Id. at 12; see also Michael Tonry, Crime and Punishment in America, 1971-1996,
OVERCROWDED TIMES, Apr. 1998, 15.
119 Losing the Vote, supra note 112, at 13; see DORIS MARE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW:
RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 1-2 (2007).

120 See Losing the Vote, supra note 112, at 13; see also Alfred Blumstein, Racial
Disproportionalityof U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743, 756-57 (1993);
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disproportionate effect the "war on drugs" has had on minority citizens,
perhaps the national "war on drugs" could be more aptly deemed the "war
on minorities."1 2 1
A further reason to attack the criminal justice system itself is that it is not
fulfilling its traditional goals; felon disenfranchisement laws do not
promote deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. First, "[r]evoking a
person's right to vote is not a strong deterrent to crime [as] it is highly
unlikely that someone who commits a crime in the face of a prison
sentence, fines, or probation, would be dissuaded by the loss of voting
rights."122 Furthermore, those who commit crimes will not be deterred by
disenfranchisement laws in large part "because most criminals don't even
know that by robbing a store, say, or selling drugs on the street corner, they
might imperil their voting rights." 23 Second, "[d]isenfranchisement does
not further incapacitation goals, as it cannot prevent an offender from
committing future crimes." 1 24 Finally, "[fjelon disenfranchisement is not
rehabilitative, as it ostracizes criminals from the political process rather
than reintegrating them into society. When excluded from voting, a person
imay fell stigmatized as a second-class citizen."1 25 Depriving "erstwhile
convicts of the ballot in no way encourages them to embrace community
norms."
Significantly, the American Law Institute has argued that
"'disenfranchisement exclude[s] offenders from society and thus [has]
increased[, not decreased,] the likelihood of recidivism."" 2 6 Conversely,
re-enfranchisement may actually encourage rehabilitation as there appears
to be a connection between voting rights and successful reintegration.127 In
fact, The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals found that "ex-offender's 'respect for law and the legal system
MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 111 (1995);
Human Rights Watch, Race and Drug Law Enforcement in the State of Georgia, A HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH SHORT REPORT, July 1996; Bailey Figler, A Vote For Democracy: Confronting The Racial

Aspects Of Felon Disenfranchisement,61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723, 747 (2006) ("During the war
on drugs in New York between 1980 and 1997, there was a 93% increase in drug offenses for whites,
and 1,6615% and 1,311% increase for Hispanics and blacks respectively.").
121 HULL, supranote 11, at 25.
122 Figler, supra note 120, at 733.
123 HULL, supra note 11, at 43.
124 Figler, supra note 120, at 733.
125 Id
126 Id. at 734; see also Elena Saxonhouse, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons'
Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1597, 1603
(2004).
127 HULL, supra note 11, at 44; see also Christy A. Visher & Jeremy Travis, Transitionsfrom
Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways, ANN. REV. OF SOC. 29, 89-113 (Aug.
2003).
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may well depend, in some measure, on his ability to participate in that
28
system.""
How should these concerns be addressed and how should we seek to
implement a positive change?
a. Allow for Judicial Determination of Disenfranchisement on a Caseby-Case Basis
We must recognize that "[c]ivil disabilities of the past differed greatly
from those imposed in modern American practice."l 29 Early
disenfranchisement laws generally only applied to the most serious crimes
and were imposed by judges on an individual basis. "Conversely, modem
felon disenfranchisement laws are implemented across the board through
state election laws, so there is no opportunity for judges to exercise
individual discretion."1 30 We must demand that the disenfranchisement of
felons, if it is to remain, be imposed by judges on an individual basis, as
was the case in the past.
There are two reasons for this. First, the list of crimes that qualify as
felonies had ballooned in recent years. The crime of larceny, a felony in
many states currently, though not a felony when many states' felon
disenfranchisement laws were enacted, is not as severe a crime as murder,
which has been considered a felony since the founding of the United
States.131 It is very unlikely, when enacting these laws, that state
legislatures had the foresight to see that less severe crimes, such as larceny,
would subject the offender to possible lifetime disenfranchisement. Second,
it is inherently inequitable to subject people convicted of "minor" felonies
to the same punishment of disenfranchisement as those who have
committed more severe felonies, such as murder. Murder carries a more
severe prison sentence than larceny, and the offender's criminal actions are
considered on an individual basis in handing down the prison sentence. If
we simply allow a judge to review the offender's crime on an
individualized basis and determine if the crime is severe enough to warrant
disenfranchisement we can alleviate, in part, the threat posed by a
128 HULL, supra note 11, at 44.
129 Figler, supra note 120, at 728; see also, ALEC EWALD, PUNISHING AT THE POLLS: THE CASE
AGAINST DISENFRANCHISING CITIZENS WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS 10, 17-18 (2003).
130 Figler, supranote 120, at 728.
131 See HULL, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that felonies "include, in addition to such serious acts as
assault and murder, relatively innocuous ones such as passing bad checks, using fake ID's, and
possessing fireworks without a license"); see also William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony
DisenfranchisementLaws: Past,Present,and Future,58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 620 (2007) (discussing that
in Mississippi grand larceny is a crime, which led to a lifetime revocation of state voting rights).
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ballooning list of felonies and the inherent inequity that exists in imposing
a punishment as severe as disenfranchisement on an across the board basis.
b. Petition the State and Federal Governments for Legislative Reforms
Because the disenfranchised cannot vote, we, America's eligible voters,
must use our voices and speak loudly in demanding legislative reform at
both the state and national level to redeem the voices of the voiceless.
Though many may think that the problem of disenfranchisement is not a
concern among voters, just the opposite is true. In fact, "a great majority of
Americans are currently opposed to felony disenfranchisement laws." 32
Elizabeth Hull notes that "more that 80 percent of Americans believe that
felons who have 'paid their debts' in full should have their voting rights
reinstated" 33 while "more than 40% would allow offenders on probation or
parole to vote." 134 We must recognize this and, in recognizing that felon
disenfranchisement is a salient issue for so many, must find the courage
and the motivation to demand reform.
There have been notable successes for concerned voters at the state level.
For example, in "March 2005, the Nebraska legislature voted (by
overruling the governor's veto) to end the state's permanent
disenfranchisement of felons." 135 In addition, "in 2000, Connecticut
restored voting rights to convicted felons on probation and Delaware
amended its constitution so that it now re-enfranchises felons five years
after completion of their sentences." 36
There have also been movements toward federal reform. Perhaps most
notably is the Count Every Vote Act, "which, among other things, ensures
that people convicted of felonies can vote in federal elections even if barred

132 Liles, supra note 131, at 616; see Brian Pinaire, Milton Heumann, & Laura Bilotta, Barred
the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisementof Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1519, 1540 (2003) (finding that 81.7% of those surveyed felt that the right to vote should be restored to
convicted felons at some point).
133 HULL, supra note 11, at 118.
134 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation,and the Debate over
Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2004); see Pinaire et al., supra note 132, at
1540 (finding that only 5%of those surveyed felt that felons should lose the right to vote only while on
parole or probation).
135 Figler, supra note 120, at 731; see Nate Jenkins, Legislature Overrides Veto,

from

JOURNALSTAR.COM

(Mar.

9,

2005

6:00

PM),

http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2005/03/lO/local/doc423101lb86575214372611.txt
(discussing
that felons will be allowed to return to the voting booth in Nebraska).
136 George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement:Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 851, 898 (2005); see Martine J. Price, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation
vs. Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 369, 401 (2002) ("In May 2000, Connecticut Governor John Rowland
signed into law a bill restoring voting rights to ex-felons on probation.").
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from voting in state elections."l 37 There have also been recommendations
submitted on behalf of National Commission on Federal Election Reform,
which would seek to reform states' disenfranchisement laws at the national
level. One such recommendation was submitted in 2001 when the
Commission, co-chaired by former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald
Ford, recommended that "'each state should allow for restoration of voting
rights to otherwise eligible citizens who have been convicted of a felony
once they have fully served their sentence, including any term of probation
or parole."' 138 In addition, the American Bar Association has also weighed
in on the debate and has approved standards on collateral sanctions that
prohibit the "deprivation of the right to vote, except during actual
confinement." 139 However, despite that progress is being made, as of yet no
reform movements have been successful at the federal level and there
remains no federal statute for restoration of a felon's civil rights.140
What is more, the justifications advanced by those who support felon
disenfranchisement laws are tenuous at best and this must be exposed. The
first justification advanced by supporters is the "subversive voting theory,
which holds that felons [and] ex-felons vote in a subversive way." 141 In
practice, however, "the evidence runs counter to the subversive voting
theory: there is no data suggesting that criminals would vote differently
than non-criminals; [however] there is evidence that offenders actually
support the existence of the laws they have broken." 142 Even putting this
argument aside, the subversive voting theory "violates the principle that
discrimination against voters based on their viewpoint is unconstitutional."
143 The second theory advanced by those who support felon
disenfranchisement laws is the "purity of the ballot box theory," which
holds that felons who, "by their acts[,] have proven themselves unfit"
should not be allowed to vote. 144 This fails for the same reason as the
subversive voting theory. "Because viewpoint discrimination is
137 Figler, supra note 120, at 732.
138 John C. Keeney Jr., Felon Disenfranchisement, in AMERICA VOTES!: A GUIDE TO MODERN
ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 91, 91 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed., 2008).
139 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS 19-2.6(a).

140 See Keeney, supra note 138, at 99 (concluding that the United States is one of the few countries
to disenfranchise former felons); see also Alec Ewald, PUNISHING AT THE POLLS: THE CASE AGAINST
DISENFRANCHISING CITIZENS WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS 7 (2003) (noting that there is "an uneven
patchwork quilt of state laws" regarding disenfranchisement statutes, even though there has been a
movement in the United States to restore voting rights).
141 Figler, supranote 120, at 735.
142 Id. at 735; Ewald, supranote 140, at 33.
143 Figler, supranote 120, at 735; see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
144 Christopher R. Murray, Note, Felon Disenfranchisementin Alaska and the Voting Rights Act of
1965,23 ALASKA L. REv. 289, 291 (2006).
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unconstitutional, the theory that a felon's vote will taint the election
process quickly breaks down."145
The third theory advanced by the supporters of felon disenfranchisement
laws is the "electoral fraud theory," which holds that, because felons have
demonstrated a willingness to break the law, it is likely that they will
commit election fraud. 14 6 However, there is no evidence that felons are
more likely to commit electoral fraud that any other voter. 147 Furthermore,
if felon disenfranchisement laws have electoral fraud prevention as their
aim, "then they are over-inclusive, as they apply across the board though
the vast majority of crimes leading to disenfranchisement are not related to
elections."l 48 Also, if felon disenfranchisement laws were enacted with the
intention of preventing electoral fraud, they are unnecessary, for we already
have laws in place to prevent election fraud and punish those who break the
law. 149
The final theory advanced by supporters of these laws is the Lockean
social-contract theory, which holds that in breaking societal rules, felons
waive their right to participate in the rule-making function of society.lso
Not only is this theory outdated, but it misinterprets the message advanced
by Locke. The social-contract theory - certainly as Locke conceived it "honors the principle of proportionality."1 5 1 Locke "made clear in his
writings that the power to strip someone of his political rights extends only
'so far as calm reason and conscience dictate what is proportionate to [the]
transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and
restraint."' 1 52 In short, the theories advanced by those who support felon
disenfranchisement laws all are simply untenable.
We must band together, provide a voice to the voiceless and demand that
felon disenfranchisement laws be reconsidered and abolished. Felons can
provide an important voice in our democracy and can strengthen it. They
145 Figler, supra note 120, at 736.
146 Id
147 Id.; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Figler, supra note 120, at 736.
149 Id. at 736-37; Mark E. Thompson, Note, Don't Do the Crime If You Ever Intend to Vote Again:
Challengingthe Disenfranchisementof Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment,33 SETON HALL
L. REv. 167, 193-94 (2002).
150 See Christopher R. Murray, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement in Alaska and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,23 ALASKA L. REV. 289, 291 (2006); Alice E. Harvey, Note, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement
and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Needfor a Second Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145, 1169-70.
151 HULL, supra note 11, at 52.
152 Id (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 126 (Thomas I. Cook, ed., Hafner
Publishing Co 1947) (1689) in which Locke asserted that lawbreakers should be "punished to that
degree, and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him
cause to repent, and terrify other from doing the like").
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have a unique insight that many of us lack. They have experienced the
injustices of the criminal justice system and may provide the voice
necessary to institute meaningful reforms within it. Furthermore, these laws
work an injustice on our friends, neighbors and loved ones; they affect us
all. If you do not believe felon disenfranchisement laws affect you or ever
will, I urge you to consider this: "if ... incarceration rates remain
unchanged, Department of Justice data indicate that an estimated one in
twenty of today's children will serve time in prison during his or her
lifetime and will be disenfranchised for at least the period of
incarceration." 153
CONCLUSION

Felon disenfranchisement laws are inherently unjust as they stigmatize
the felon as a second class citizen, deny one of the most sacred American
rights, harm our.nation's most needy and crime ridden communities by
diluting their voting strength and retard the workings of our democratic
system by silencing an entire class of citizens who possess a helpful and
informative voice and create a cycle whereby those in power are able to
retain their power by disenfranchising more and more citizens. We must
seek to abolish disenfranchisement laws and must use all avenues of attack.
First, disenfranchised, minority plaintiffs must continue to pursue claims
under the VRA. Though Farrakhanproved, in the end, an unsuccessful
claim, the decisions and findings of the courts in the Ninth Circuit prior to
the en banc hearing were significant for they showed that these claims may
yet have some life. Second, we must attack the criminal justice system
itself as the major indirect cause of disenfranchisement. In order to do so,
we must petition our state and national governments for reconsideration
and reformation of disenfranchisement laws and must demand that
disenfranchisement, if it is to remain, be determined by a judge on and
individualized and case-by-case basis. Finally, felon disenfranchisement
laws raise serious Eighth Amendment concerns. Claims must be filed
attacking these laws for what they are, a punishment which not only
offends our country's evolving standards of decency but is grossly
disproportionate and excessive to many of the crimes committed by felons.

153 Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony DisenfranchisementLaws in the United States, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT 12 (1998), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/FVR/fd-losingthevote.pdf.

